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Obesity rates in the U.S. have doubled since 1980.  Given the medical, social, and financial costs of
obesity, a large percentage of Americans are attempting to lose weight at any given time but the vast
majority of weight loss attempts fail.  Researchers continue to search for safe and effective methods
of weight loss, and this paper examines one promising method - offering financial rewards for weight
loss. This paper studies data on 2,407 employees in 17 worksites who participated in a year-long worksite
health promotion program that offered financial rewards for weight loss.  The intervention varied by
employer, in some cases offering steady quarterly rewards for weight loss and in other cases requiring
participants to post a bond that would be refunded at year’s end conditional on achieving certain weight
loss goals.  Still others received no financial incentives at all and serve as a control group.  We examine
the basic patterns of enrollment, attrition, and weight loss in these three groups. Weight loss is modest.
After one year, it averages 1.4 pounds for those paid steady quarterly rewards and 3.6 pounds for
those who posted a refundable bond, under the assumption that dropouts experienced no weight loss.
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Obesity, defined as a body mass index
2 (BMI) of 30 or higher, has more than 
doubled in U.S. since 1980 (Flegal et al. 2002).  As of 2003-2004, 66.3 percent of 
Americans were at least overweight (BMI of 25 or higher) and 32.2 percent were obese 
(Ogden et al. 2006).   
Obesity imposes a variety of health, financial, and psychic costs: greater risk of 
illnesses such as diabetes and hypertension (Must et al. 1999), higher health care costs 
(Finkelstein, Fiebelkorn, and Wang 2003), higher job absenteeism (Cawley et al. 2007), 
lower quality of life, especially for women (Muennig et al. 2006), lower wages for 
women, especially white women (Cawley 2004), and greater risk of death, especially 
from cardiovascular disease (Flegal et al. 2007).   
A variety of approaches are being used to treat obesity and encourage weight loss.  
One promising strategy based on psychology and behavioral economics is to offer 
financial incentives for weight loss.  Obesity is costly to health insurance companies 
(Finkelstein et al. 2003) and employers (Cawley et al. 2007), so for either or both of those 
organizations to offer monetary incentives for enrollees or employees to lose weight 
could be mutually beneficial. 
This paper studies data from a firm that coordinates a program of financial 
incentives for weight loss in various worksites in the U.S.  We study attrition and weight 
loss in three types of incentive programs: one that offers no financial rewards for weight 
loss, one that offers quarterly payments that rise in value with the amount of weight loss, 
and a third that takes deposits (bonds) that are only refunded if the employee achieves a 
specific weight loss goal and also includes a quarterly lottery for those who have lost 
                                                 
2 BMI is defined as weight in kilograms divided by height in meters squared.   3
weight.  Relative to previous studies of weight loss in response to financial incentives, 
strengths of this study include a large sample size (2,407) and a long intervention (one 
year).   
A 2007 Institute of Medicine report on obesity prevention set the immediate next 
step – which it described as an essential priority action for the near future – as “learning 
what works and what does not work and broadly sharing that information.” (IOM 2007, 
p. 410).  It also notes that “All types of evaluation can make an important contribution to 
the evidence base upon which to design policies, programs, and interventions.” (Ibid, p. 
4).  This paper makes a contribution to that effort by documenting enrollment, attrition, 
and weight loss in one interesting and promising intervention.  This paper presents basic 
patterns in the data; a subsequent paper will estimate regression models to test specific 
hypotheses about attrition and weight loss. 
 
Conceptual Framework and Previous Literature  
For obese people, weight loss would likely result in substantial benefits.
3  For 
example, the health benefits of modest weight loss (defined as 5-10% of starting weight) 
include decreased blood pressure and cholesterol and a 25% reduction in mortality risk 
for type 2 diabetics (Vidal, 2002).  Weight loss may also improve quality of life (Ford et 
al. 2001).   There may also be financial benefits.  Cawley (2004) finds a causal impact of 
weight on wages, and that obese white females earn roughly 11 percent less than healthy-
                                                 
3 There are two ways researchers have sought to measure the benefits of weight loss.  The first is to 
examine changes in outcomes associated with losing weight.  The second is to compare the outcomes of 
individuals of different weight, and assume that the difference in outcomes is due to the difference in 
weight.  Each has its limitations: weight loss studies often lack power, and comparisons across weight 
levels are confounded by differences in unobserved characteristics.  Vidal (2002) assesses the evidence on 
the benefits of weight loss and concludes that modest weight loss (5-10% of initial body weight) improves 
cardiovascular risk factors and helps prevent or delay the onset of type 2 diabetes and hypertension.   4
weight white females.  Finkelstein et al. (2003) calculate that, relative to the healthy 
weight, the obese incur $125 higher annual out-of-pocket health care costs.  With two-
thirds of Americans overweight or obese (Ogden et al. 2006), and given these potential 
benefits of weight loss, it may not be surprising that 46 percent of all American women 
and 33 percent of all American men are trying to lose weight (Bish et al. 2005). 
Most people fail in their attempts to lose weight
4, and many of those who are 
successful in losing weight regain it in a short period of time.
 5  For example, in one 
community-based study of weight gain prevention (Crawford et al., 2000), most (53.7%) 
participants gained weight in the first twelve months, three-quarters gained weight over 
three years, and only 4.6% lost weight and maintained the loss for three years.  
Theory and evidence from psychology and behavioral economics provide several 
explanations for why so many weight loss attempts fail.  First, the benefits of weight loss 
are not salient.  For example, foregone quality of life and lost wages are not visible and 
therefore they are frequently unrecognized as opportunity costs (Bastiat, 1850).   
A second possible explanation for repeated failure at weight loss is that the 
benefits of weight loss may not be immediate.  Improvements in health and labor market 
outcomes may not occur for some time after weight loss, and Ainslie (1975) finds 
                                                 
4 Some obese individuals are able to lose weight by modifying their behaviors: eating less and exercising 
more.  In the select group enrolled in the Weight Control Registry, all of whom have lost at least 30 pounds 
and kept it off for at least one year, 44.6% report losing the weight entirely on their own, that is, without the 
help of a commercial program, physician, or nutritionist (Wing and Phelan, 2005).  Clearly such statistics 
do not generalize to the population; anyone who failed at initial weight loss is ineligible for this registry of 
people who maintained weight loss for a year. 
5 Conventional wisdom is that virtually no one succeeds at maintaining weight loss.  This perception has 
been traced back to a 1959 study of 100 obese individuals in which only 2 percent maintained loss of 20 
pounds or more two years after the treatment (Stunkard and McLaren-Hume 1959; Wing and Phelan 2005).  
However, the 1959 study was based on a crude diet intervention with negligible support or follow-up so its 
poor results may not generalize to today’s much more intensive interventions.   5
consistent evidence that there is a decline in the effectiveness of rewards as the rewards 
are delayed from the time of choice.   
A third explanation for repeated failure at weight loss is that, contrary to the 
standard economic model of discounted utility (Samuelson 1937), people may discount 
hyperbolically, which produces time-inconsistent preferences (Ainsley 1975).  In this 
context, time inconsistent preferences mean that people want to do what is in their long-
run interest (lose weight), but they consistently succumb to the temptation to eat and be 
sedentary.  Thaler and Shefrin (1981) describe individual decision-making as a battle 
between a farsighted planner (who in this context wants to diet) and a myopic doer (who 
in this context wants to eat and be sedentary).   
One intervention, financial rewards for weight loss, may offer a solution to the 
problems of salience, immediacy, and time-inconsistency.  Financial rewards, even 
though they may be dwarfed in value by the other benefits of weight loss, have the 
benefit of being salient, with their amount and delivery date known with certainty in 
exchange for clearly defined objectives.  Even small financial incentives can be effective 
because research has found that people tend not to compare payoffs to their income or 
wealth but instead “bracket” them - consider them in isolation (Read et al. 1999; 
Kahneman and Tversky 1979).  Lotteries may be particularly cost-effective incentives for 
healthy behavior.  People tend to overweight the probability of unlikely events and 
underweight the probability of likely events (Kahneman and Tversky 1979), implying 
that lotteries can be more attractive than certain payments even if the two have equal 
expected values.  Financial rewards can also be paid immediately, before other benefits 
of weight reduction may be realized.     6
Financial rewards can also be structured to help people with time-inconsistent 
preferences stay committed to weight loss.  In general, pre-commitment devices may help 
people with time-inconsistent preferences empower their farsighted planner (Strotz 1956; 
Laibson 1997).  In this context, one could allow people to post a bond that is 
automatically forfeited if they fail to achieve their weight loss goals.  Such a bond allows 
a person to influence their own future decisions by increasing the punishment for 
succumbing to short-run temptation.  People tend to exhibit loss aversion – they dislike 
losing their own money more than they like winning an equal amount of someone else’s 
money (Tversky and Kahneman 1991; Camerer 2005), which suggests that a posted bond 
may be more effective than a reward of the same size.  Using a bond to increase 
adherence to a weight-loss regimen does not guarantee success.  Even individuals who 
are aware of their time-inconsistent preferences may still be partially naive in that they 
overestimate their future willpower (O’Donoghue and Rabin 2001) and as a result may 
either post too small a bond or have too much faith in the bond as a precommitment 
device. 
Motivated by these theories and findings, several businesses now help employers 
offer financial incentives for employee weight loss.  In addition, several businesses help 
consumers post bonds that are only refunded if one achieves specific weight loss goals.  
The William Hill betting agency in the U.K. books wagers that the bettor cannot achieve 
a specified weight loss in a specific period of time and verifies the weight loss with a 
medical examination (Burger and Lynham 2008).
6  A company named stickK.com
7 that 
                                                 
6 This market is relatively small – the annual number of applications for such bets is roughly 200 (Burger 
and Lynham, 2008) 
7 The website’s Frequently Asked Questions page states that the company’s name includes two K’s because 
"K" often symbolizes "contract" in legal writing.   7
was founded by Yale economists Ian Ayres and Dean Karlan allows people to post bonds 
that are forfeited if they fail to meet their weight loss goal.  However, verification is 
weak: success in achieving one’s goal is determined (and refunds are made) based on 
either the honor system or through verification by a third party chosen by the bettor, and 
if the third party doesn’t submit a report the self-report of the bettor is accepted. 
The contribution of this paper is to examine outcomes in a program that offers 
various financial rewards (including certain payments, lotteries, and refundable bonds) 
for weight loss.  The outcomes we examine include attrition and weight loss, both in 
pounds and as a percentage of baseline weight.   
A substantial literature confirms that financial incentives influence healthy 
behaviors.  Kane et al. (2004) review 42 studies of the effect of economic incentives on 
preventive behaviors such as immunization, smoking cessation, and exercise; they find 
that the economic incentives were effective at changing behavior in 73% of studies.  
Financial incentives form the basis for an innovative substance abuse treatment program 
known as contingency management.  A meta-analysis found overwhelming evidence that 
such incentives raise compliance (drug abstinence) by an average of 30 percent (Lussier 
et al., 2006).  Consistent with bracketing, even small financial incentives have proven 
effective; for example, as little as $2.50 for a single negative test result for cocaine 
(Higgins et al., 2002). 
Specific to the current context, there is mixed empirical evidence on the extent to 
which weight loss is responsive to financial rewards.  A recent review and meta-analysis 
(Paul-Ebhohimhen and Avenell 2007) identified nine published randomized controlled 
trials (RCTs) that used guaranteed financial incentives (i.e. certain payments, not   8
lotteries) for weight loss, with a follow-up of at least one year.  The meta-analysis was 
unable to reject the null hypothesis of no effect of financial rewards on weight loss; it 
calculated a mean weight loss of 0.4 kg at 12 months, which was not statistically 
significant.  A broader set of studies (including, e.g., those with non-randomized designs 
or shorter follow-up) are listed in Appendix Table 1.
8  
Relative to past studies, ours has several advantages.  This study has a relatively 
large sample size (2,407); for comparison, the sample size of all published RCTs of 
financial incentives for weight loss combined totals 424 (treatment N=252, control 
N=172) (Paul-Ebhohimhen and Avenell, 2007).  The intervention studied by this paper 
also covers a relatively long time period (one year).  Moreover, we examine data from a 
real-world intervention rather than one constructed by and overseen by researchers, 
which is important because a criticism of studies of weight loss programs is that it is 
unclear how the results of pilot programs generalize to real-world implementation.  A 
limitation of this study, however, is that it is opportunistic data; individuals were not 
randomly assigned to different incentive schedules for weight loss. 
 
Description of the Intervention 
Our data come from a company (that we will call Company X) that helps 
employers provide financial incentives for their employees to lose weight; specifically, it 
monitors employee weight loss and pays the rewards.  After an employer contracts with 
Company X, Company X has a kickoff event in the workplace that explains the program 
to the employees and encourages them to sign up.  Participation is optional.  Those who 
                                                 
8 There are other studies that offer financial rewards for exercise or for attending weight loss programs, but 
Appendix Table 1 is limited to studies of financial rewards for weight loss.   9
sign up select a physical activity regimen at either the foundation (easiest), intermediate, 
or advanced level.  The program consists of several elements: 1) daily email coaching 
that includes information about healthy and effective methods of weight loss including 
decreasing calorie intake and increasing physical activity in a manner consistent with the 
regimen the enrollee chose at baseline; 2) call center support; 3) weigh-ins at least once a 
quarter; and 4) financial incentives for achieving specific weight loss targets.  Only 
employees who are overweight (BMI of at least 25) are eligible to receive financial 
rewards, and no financial rewards will be paid once an employee’s BMI falls below 25 
(i.e. when the employee falls into the “healthy weight” category).   
The weigh-ins take place in HIPAA-compliant
9 kiosks that company X installs in 
the employer’s workplace.  Employees enter the privacy-protected kiosk and stand on a 
scale; their body mass index is recorded and sent over an internet connection to their 
personal webpage as well as to Company X’s database.  Participants can weigh 
themselves as often as they like, and the lowest recorded weight will be counted as that 
quarter’s weight.  Financial rewards are paid based on percent of baseline weight lost.
10   
Company X has a standard set of incentives that it proposes, but employers can 
modify it.  In our data, there are three incentive schedules.  The first is Company X’s 
standard set of incentives: the employee participants pay no fee (all costs are paid by the 
employer), and employees receive quarterly payments determined by percent of baseline 
                                                 
9 The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) regulates the disclosure of health 
information. 
10 We asked Company X whether people game the system by trying to weigh more at baseline (from which 
future weight losses are judged).  They said that through the cameras installed in their kiosks they do not 
see people wearing heavier clothes to the baseline weigh-in than to later weigh-ins; in all cases people seem 
for vanity reasons to remove shoes and sweaters before weighing in.  However, Company X acknowledges 
that they have no way to know if people (e.g.) hid weights in their pockets or shoes before the baseline 
weigh-in.  If people engage in such deception then we would expect to see significant drops in weight at the 
first weigh-in after baseline but we do not find this pattern in the data.   10
weight lost to date.  Table 1 lists the standard set of incentives: payment thresholds occur 
at each percentage point of weight loss up to 5% (1, 2, 3, 4, 5), then thresholds occur 
every 5 percentage points (5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30) up to 30% of weight loss.  The payment 
associated with these thresholds varies; for the first seven (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 10, 15) the reward 
is a dollar per percentage point of weight loss.  Then the per-percentage-point rewards 
increase: $25 for losing 20%, $35 for losing 25%, and $50 for losing 30%.  These are 
monthly amounts that are paid quarterly, so someone who loses 5% of his weight and 
keeps it off for three months receives a $15 check for the quarter ($5 monthly payment x 
3 months).  Five employers (with a total of thirteen worksites participating) used this 
standard incentives schedule. 
The second incentive schedule, used by one employer (with two worksites 
participating), is shown in Table 2 and includes both a lottery and a deposit contract. The 
lottery takes place each quarter and the prizes are gift certificates (ten $50 gift cards and 
ten $50 salon vouchers); only those who had lost some weight since baseline are eligible 
for the drawing.  The deposit contract is that employees must pay $9.95 per month 
(except the first month, which is free), all of which (11 * $9.95 or $109.45) is refunded at 
the end of the year if the respondent loses at least 5% of baseline weight by year’s end.  If 
the respondent loses 10% or more of their baseline weight, they receive in addition to 
their refunded fees ($109.45) a $100 bonus, for a total of $229.40.  In addition, the 
“biggest loser” (as a percent of baseline weight) receives a $250 gift certificate at the end 
of the year.   
Whether a participant would receive a higher payoff in the standard or modified 
group depends on both quarter and magnitude of weight loss.  In quarters one through   11
three, the standard incentives are more generous than the modified incentives at all levels 
of weight loss, with the exception that those losing between 0.1% and 0.9% of baseline 
weight receive no reward in the standard incentives group but are eligible for the lottery 
for gift cards in the modified incentives group.  In quarter four, the standard incentives 
are more generous for weight loss of between 1% and 4%, but the modified incentives are 
more generous for weight loss of 5% or more. 
The third schedule, used by one employer (with a total of two worksites), offered 
no incentives for weight loss, but did include one modest incentive to not attrite: 
participants were promised $20 if they participated for the entire year (i.e. weighed in at 
least once in each of the four quarters).  This group received all of the features of the 
Company X intervention (daily emails, call center access, weigh-ins at the kiosk) but 
were offered no incentives for weight loss, making it useful both as a control group for 
measuring the impact of financial incentives isolated from all the other program 
elements, and for estimating the impact of the Company X treatment minus the financial 
incentives. 
Figure 1 presents a flow diagram of attrition and analysis for all three groups 
(standard incentives, modified incentives, control) combined.   
 
Hypotheses 
  Part of our purpose in this paper is exploratory - to measure enrollment, attrition 
and weight loss in these programs.  We focus in particular on attrition and weight loss as 
outcomes because the NIH Technology Assessment Conference Panel (1993) 
recommends using the percentage of all beginning participants who complete the   12
program, and the percentage of those completing the program who achieve various 
degrees of weight loss as measures of program success.  The NIH considers a loss of 10% 
of baseline weight in 6 months to one year to be good progress for an obese individual 
(NHLBI 2000). 
Another purpose of this paper is to test the following hypotheses. 
Hypotheses Regarding Enrollment 
There will be lower enrollment in the program that required people to post 
forfeitable bonds.  The law of demand states that the quantity demanded falls with price.  
The program that requires people to post a forfeitable bond raises the expected price of 
participation, assuming that not all possible participants expect a 100% probability of 
success (and therefore the return of their bond).  The published literature confirms that, 
all else equal, enrollment in weight loss programs is lower if people are asked to post 
forfeitable bonds (e.g. Jeffery et al. 1978).   
Those who are willing to post a forfeitable bond will be better motivated or 
prepared for weight loss than those not required to post such a bond.   
In other words, we expect differential selection – those unwilling to post a 
forfeitable bond are excluded from the modified incentives group but are not excluded 
from the control group or standard incentives group.  As a result, we expect that the 
modified incentives group will be better prepared or motivated for weight loss than the 
other groups. 
Hypotheses Regarding Attrition 
There will be lower attrition in the program that required employees to post 
bonds that are refundable based on achievement of weight loss goals.  Those willing   13
to post a bond are expected to be more motivated or determined to lose weight.   
Selection aside, bonds may also increase retention. 
Those who attrite will have been relatively unsuccessful at weight loss. 
Participants enroll with incomplete information about certain costs and benefits of 
participating.  Those that lose relatively little weight may update their prior beliefs and 
conclude that it is utility maximizing for them to drop out of the intervention.  This is 
especially true of those in the modified incentives group, who are charged a monthly fee 
for participation that will not be refunded if year-end weight loss is less than 5% of 
baseline weight.     
Hypotheses Regarding Weight Loss 
Weight loss will be greater for those offered financial rewards for weight 
loss.  Both the standard incentives group and the modified incentives group were offered 
financial rewards for weight loss, whereas the control group were not offered any.  In 
other words, we hypothesize that financial rewards are effective in promoting weight 
loss. 
In quarter 4 weight loss will be greater in the modified incentives group than 
in the standard incentives group. 
This prediction is based on the magnitudes of the incentives; the modified 
incentives group has much greater incentives for 5% and 10% weight loss by the end of 
quarter 4.  Specifically, the modified incentives group receives a refund of their $119.40 
bond if at least 5% of weight is lost, with an additional bonus of $100 if 10% of weight is 
lost.  Moreover, those achieving very high weight loss will be in competition for the $250 
bonus for being the “biggest loser”.  In contrast, the standard incentives group is paid $5   14
per month for losing 5% of starting weight and $10 per month for losing 10% of starting 
weight (triple those amounts for the entire quarter).  Relative to the standard incentives, 
the modified incentives create greater incentive for weight loss by the end of quarter four. 
In addition, there are two reasons that the relative performance of the modified 
incentives group by the end of quarter 4 might be better than one would expect based on 
the magnitude of the rewards alone.  First, we expect differential selection - those willing 
to post a bond are likely better prepared or more motivated for weight loss.  Second, the 
research literature on loss aversion indicates that people are more motivated by a risk of 
losing their own money (as in the modified incentives group) than they are by the 
prospect of winning someone else’s money (as in the standard incentives group).   
In quarters 1 through 3, weight loss will be greater in the standard incentives 
group than in the modified incentives group. 
This prediction is also based on the magnitudes of the incentives.  In quarters 1 
through 3, the standard incentives group is offered $5 per month for 5% weight loss, and 
$10 per month for 10% weight loss (see Table 1 for the full schedule of financial 
rewards).  In contrast, there is no marginal reward for 5% or 10% weight loss in any of 
the first three quarters for the modified incentives group (those losing any weight at all 
are eligible for lottery prizes, but there is no additional reward for any weight loss above 
the trivial amount that makes one eligible for the lottery).  
However, there are three reasons that the relative performance of the modified 
incentives group in quarters one through three might be better than one would expect 
based on the magnitude of the rewards alone.  The first reason is differential selection.  
The second reason is loss aversion; the fear of losing one’s money at year’s end may   15
motivate members of the modified incentives group to lose weight in the early quarters, 
even when there are no quarter-specific rewards for doing so.  Third, it may take more 
than one quarter to achieve 5% or 10% weight loss, so in order to meet their year-end 
goals members of the modified incentives group may have to lose weight in earlier 
quarters, even though they have no financial incentives for meaningful weight loss in 
those quarters. 
 
Methods and Data 
A limitation of our data is that they are not the result of a randomized controlled 
trial. They are opportunistic data, provided to us by Company X.  As a result, we face 
two challenges: 1) assignment to the three treatment groups is nonrandom: the incentive 
schedules were chosen by the employers; 2) the participation of employees is voluntary; 
there is selection by employees.   
Regarding problem #1 (selection by employers into different incentive schedules), 
we assume that this is ignorable.  In other words, we assume that employer preference for 
incentive structure is uncorrelated with unobserved employee characteristics that affect 
attrition and weight loss.  Company X told us that the reason that one employer requested 
the modified incentives schedule (with forfeitable bonds) is because the company didn’t 
want to pay for cash rewards.  This would be more problematic if the employer requested 
the modified schedule because the employer thought it would be more effective for their 
particular employees. 
A related problem is that unobserved employee characteristics may vary 
systematically across the three groups.  Company X designed this intervention for office   16
employees who spend their days in front of computers; it is they, for example, who are 
most likely to read the daily emails regarding nutrition and physical activity.  For the 
most part, enrollees fit this description.  Table 3 lists the industries of the employers.  The 
five employers (with a total of 13 worksites) in the standard incentive group include an 
HMO office, an HMO clinic (in which enrollees are nurses), two bank offices, and an 
insurance company.  The one employer (with a total of two worksites) that instituted the 
modified incentive schedule is an insurance company, and the one employer (with a total 
of two worksites) in the control group is a grocery administrative office.  Company X 
tells us that the nurses (who face the standard incentive schedule) have generally been 
least compliant with the program; they speculate that it may be because they do not work 
in front of computers all day and thus derive less benefit from the daily emails and the 
online tracking of measured weight. 
Regarding problem #2 (selection by employees into participation), we consider 
this to be a limitation for generalizing results to the entire population but not a problem in 
the sense that any similar intervention is also likely to be optional, and so the findings for 
a set of volunteers is most relevant.  All of the studies in Appendix Table 1 are all based 
on volunteers recruited to participate in a weight loss program, and are likewise not a 
random sample of the general population.   
An additional problem when studying weight loss is that there is attrition from the 
program.  Weight-loss interventions in general (even those without financial rewards) 
typically have substantial attrition (Ware 2003; Gadbury et al. 2003).  There are several 
strategies for handling the attrition when evaluating interventions.  The definitive is the 
intent-to-treat analysis, which includes all patients in their groups, regardless of whether   17
they received the treatment, deviated from the protocol or withdrew (Ware 2003).  
However, to implement this one must have follow-up data on all of the dropouts, which is 
not available in this case.  Another option is to conduct a “completers” analysis, which 
examines data only for those who completed the study.  This is likely to be biased toward 
showing an impact of the treatment, as those most likely to quit are probably those for 
whom the intervention was least effective (Ware 2003).  Another option is last-
observation-carried-forward, which assumes that the dropouts remained at their last 
measured weight.  This also likely results in upward bias in estimates of program 
effectiveness, as weight regain is common (Ware 2003; Serdula et al. 1999).  Another 
option is baseline-carried-forward, which assumes that after attriting the subjects return to 
their baseline weight.  This may cause downward bias in the estimate of efficacy, as 
weight regain may be incomplete or slow.  We present findings for completers analysis, 
last-observation-carried-forward, and baseline-carried-forward.   
The total number of employees in the dataset is 2,407: 1,513 facing the standard 
incentives, 765 facing the modified incentives, and 129 in the control group with no 
financial incentives.  The data cover 2004-2008.  We drop from the sample participants 
with baseline BMI below 25 because they were not eligible for financial rewards.  
Thirteen participants in the control group were dropped because they were 
simultaneously participating in another workplace weight-loss intervention. 
We estimate attrition rates by quarter and group.  We graph the distribution of 
weight loss by group and quarter, both for a completers analysis (ignoring dropouts), 
assuming that dropouts stayed at their last measured weight (last observation carried 
forward) and assuming that dropouts return to baseline (baseline carried forward).  We   18
also calculate the unconditional mean loss in pounds and percent of baseline weight lost 
by group and quarter, for a completers analysis, last observation carried forward, and 
baseline carried forward.   
 
Empirical Results 
Descriptive statistics:  
Table 4 presents the summary statistics for participants by group.  Our overall 
sample (N=2,407) consists of 1,513 participants in the standard incentives group, 765 
participants in the modified incentives group, and 129 participants in the control group. 
In each of these groups, men are a minority: 15.7% of the standard incentives 
group, 21.2% of the modified incentives group, and 35.7% of the control group.  The 
average age of participants ranges from 43.0 to 46.2 across groups, and average baseline 
BMI ranges between 31.3 and 32.8 across groups.  In each group there is a strikingly high 
prevalence of morbid obesity (BMI of greater than or equal to 40). In the U.S. as a whole, 
the morbidly obese constitute 4.8% of the population and 7.3% of all overweight 
Americans (Ogden et al. 2006). In contrast, the morbidly obese constitute 28.7% of the 
standard incentives group, 30.5% of the modified incentives group, and 22.5% of the 
control group. 
Enrollment 
We hypothesized that: There will be lower enrollment in the program that 
required people to post forfeitable bonds.  Table 5 lists the percent of the workforce 
that enrolled in the program, by incentive schedule.  Ideally we would know the number 
of employees with BMI of 25 or higher, because only they are eligible for financial   19
rewards for weight loss.  Instead, for the denominator we know only the total number of 
employees (i.e. those of all BMI).  As a result, these are likely to be underestimates of the 
percentage of those eligible for financial rewards who enrolled in the program.  Percent 
enrollment was 18.6% for the modified incentives (which required a bond), 24.8% for the 
standard incentives, and 20.3% for the program that offered no financial rewards for 
weight loss but all of the other program elements (i.e. the control group).  The point 
estimates of enrollment are consistent with our prediction that the requirement of a bond 
would result in lower enrollment, but the differences are not statistically significant. 
We also hypothesized that: Those who are willing to post a forfeitable bond 
will be better motivated or prepared for weight loss than those not required to post 
such a bond.  There are two variables that can give us information about the degree of 
such differences in selection. The first variable is the level of exercise regimen that the 
employee chose at the beginning of the program.  If those willing to pay the monthly fees 
in the modified incentives group are more motivated or prepared to lose weight, one 
should find that they are less likely to choose the easiest exercise regimen.  This is 
confirmed by the data.  Table 4 indicates that the easiest exercise regimen (called 
Foundation) was chosen by 60.1% of the standard incentives group but only 55.0% of the 
modified incentives group, a difference significant at the 1% level.  We also expected that 
the control group, offered $20 if they participated for the full year, would be less 
motivated on average and therefore more likely to choose the easiest exercise regimen 
than those in the modified incentives group, but we do not find this – an even lower 
percentage of the control group than the modified incentives group (48.8% versus 60.1%) 
chose the easiest exercise regimen, but the difference is not statistically significant.       20
The second variable that sheds light on difference in selectivity is the percentage 
of the program emails that enrollees read.  If those willing to pay the monthly fees in the 
modified incentives group are more motivated or prepared to lose weight, one should find 
that they read a higher percentage of the program emails.  That prediction is confirmed by 
the data – Table 4 indicates that the average percentage of emails read was 51.0% for 
members of the modified incentives group compared to 45.7% for members of the 
standard incentives group, a difference significant at the 1% level.  (A caveat is that this 
variable is missing for 51.1% of the standard incentives group – it simply wasn’t 
recorded for certain employers in certain years.)   
The control group, being paid to participate, had the lowest email open rate of 
28.7%, which is significantly different from both other groups at the 1% level.  It is 
interesting that the control group had the lowest percentage choosing the easiest exercise 
regimen (which suggests more motivation or better preparation) but the lowest email 
open rate (which suggests lower commitment). 
Overall, the patterns of both exercise regimen and email opening suggest that the 
group required to post a bond (i.e. the modified incentives group) was selected to be 
better prepared and more serious about weight loss than the standard incentives group, 
and therefore should be less likely to attrite and more likely to lose weight. 
Attrition 
Table 6 lists the cumulative percentages dropping out, by quarter, for each group. 
In the standard incentives group, 51.2% of baseline participants have dropped out by the 
end of quarter 1, and cumulative attrition rises in the three subsequent quarters to 62.1%, 
72.0% and 76.4%.  In the modified incentives group, attrition is lower: 24.8% after one   21
quarter, rising in the three subsequent quarters to 33.5%, 39.3%, and 57.4%.  Even in the 
control group, where participants are promised $20 if they weigh in every quarter for a 
year, attrition is substantial: 25.6% after one quarter, rising in the three subsequent 
quarters to 39.5%, 45.0%, and 48.1%.  When considering the levels of attrition, one 
should keep in mind that enrollees were already a select sample.  Participation was 
optional, and most employees declined to enroll.   
Attrition is typically substantial in weight loss interventions of all kinds (Ware 
2003; Gadbury et al. 2003).  However, the attrition in these groups is particularly high.  
For example, a recent review (Paul-Ebhohimhen and Avenuell, 2007) of RCTs involving 
financial rewards for weight loss found that the maximum attrition in any such study was 
57.9% at 13 months, far below what the standard incentives group experienced in 12 
months (76.4%) but roughly equal to what the modified incentives group experienced at 
12 months (57.4%).  This suggests that real-world interventions may experience far 
higher rates of attrition than those overseen by researchers (who for the purposes of data 
quality undertake extensive efforts to keep enrollees from attriting), which raises 
questions about how well the results of pilot studies such as those in Appendix Table 1 
can be duplicated on a larger scale.   
We hypothesized that There will be lower attrition in the program that 
required employees to post bonds that are refundable based on achievement of 
weight loss goals.  The data are consistent with this hypothesis; in every quarter, attrition 
is significantly lower in the modified than the standard incentives group. For example, 
after quarter 1 attrition in the modified incentives group is only half that in the standard 
incentives group (24.8% versus 51.2%).  It impossible to tell from our data whether the   22
difference in attrition is due to selection or loss aversion.  Selection was evident in the 
earlier finding that those in the modified incentives group were more likely to choose an 
advanced physical activity regimen and tend to open more program emails; before 
entering the program they may have been better prepared and more motivated to lose 
weight.  On the other hand, those in the modified incentives group have “skin in the 
game” in the form of their deposits, and loss aversion may motivate them to stay in the 
program.   
We also hypothesized that: Those who attrite will have been relatively 
unsuccessful at weight loss.  Table 7 lists the weight loss by quarter, categorized by 
whether the participant dropped out in the following quarter or persisted in the program 
through the following quarter.  The table is divided vertically into four panels: full 
sample, standard incentives group, modified incentives group, control group.  Among the 
full sample, those who drop out in the subsequent quarter have significantly lower 
average weight loss than those who persist through the next quarter, in quarters 1, 2, and 
3.  In each case the difference in mean weight loss to date is statistically significant at 
better than the 1% level.  When we divide the sample by incentive schedule, the same 
pattern exists for those in the modified incentives group: in each of the first three 
quarters, weight loss to date is significantly lower among those who drop out in the 
following quarter than those who persist through the following quarter.  Note that those 
in the modified incentives group have the greatest incentive to drop out if they are not 
making progress, because to persist would require paying monthly fees that one is 
unlikely to have refunded.  The pattern is weaker for the standard incentives group; in 
quarter 2 future dropouts have significantly lower weight loss than those who persist   23
through the next quarter, but the difference is not statistically significant.  In quarter 1 
and in quarter 3 the sign is in the opposite direction and the difference is not statistically 
significant.  For the control group, in no quarter do future dropouts have significantly 
lower weight loss to date than those who will persist in the program. 
Weight Loss 
The distribution of percent weight loss, by quarter, is shown in Figures 2 (for the 
standard incentives group), Figures 3 (for the modified incentives group), and Figures 4 
(for the control group).  The horizontal axis shows the percent of baseline weight lost 
(rounded down to the nearest percentage point
11) as of that quarter, and the vertical axis 
indicates the percentage of that sample.  For each group, there is a separate page devoted 
to the data for each quarter.  On each page are three graphs: the top graph is the 
distribution of weight loss in a completers analysis that ignores dropouts, the middle 
graph is from a last observation carried forward analysis in which dropouts are assumed 
to have stayed at their last measured weight, and the bottom graph is the distribution of 
weight loss in a baseline-carried-forward analysis that assumes that every dropout 
returned to their baseline weight.  For any given page, a comparison of the top, middle, 
and bottom graphs confirms that how attrition is handled has a substantial impact on 
estimated weight loss. In the top graphs (the completers analysis), the distribution of 
outcomes seems more favorable (although the modal outcome is usually zero weight 
loss), but in the middle and bottom graphs that include information on dropouts, by far 
                                                 
11 We round down so that everyone indicated as having a specific percent weight loss received exactly the 
reward associated with that percent weight loss.  If we rounded to the nearest percentage point, a participant 
who lost 4.6% of her starting weight would be rounded to 5% even though she would not have qualified for 
the financial reward associated with achieving 5% weight loss.   24
the most common outcome is that respondents lost zero weight (largely driven by the 
assumption of setting dropouts at baseline weight). 
Each of the graphs in Figure 3-4 indicate that more people in the modified 
incentives group are just over the thresholds of 5% weight loss (at which participants are 
refunded their year’s worth of fees, or $109.46) and 10% weight loss (at which they also 
receive a $100 bonus), then just under the thresholds.  This is less apparent in quarters 1-
3 (Figures 3-1, 3-2, and 3-3), when there were no financial rewards tied to those 
thresholds for the modified incentives group.  Moreover, such heaping is not apparent in 
the distribution associated with the standard incentive schedule, which has more 
continuous reward thresholds.  This suggests that people may be pushing to achieve the 
substantial payoffs associated with losing 5% or 10% of baseline weight. 
We next discuss the evidence regarding our hypotheses regarding weight loss. 
Weight loss will be greater for those offered financial rewards for weight 
loss.  We test for differences in unconditional means of weight loss in pounds and percent 
of baseline weight by quarter and group.  We then test for differences in unconditional 
probability of losing 5% and 10% of baseline body weight.  Note that the differences 
between the treatment groups and the control group can be interpreted as the effect of the 
financial incentives, distinct from all of the other program elements (e.g. daily emails and 
call center support) shared by the control group.  
Table 8 lists weight loss in pounds and percent of baseline weight, by group and 
quarter.  The cells also list the minimum and maximum weight loss (a negative minimum 
weight loss indicates weight gain) for that group in that quarter (the minimum and 
maximum are not affected by how dropouts are treated, so they are entered in only the   25
leftmost column for each group).  Because so many participants drop out, and attrition is 
correlated with weight loss success, estimates of average weight loss are extremely 
sensitive to how attrition is handled.  We focus here on the baseline carried forward 
analysis, which assumes that everyone who dropped out went back to their baseline 
weight.  
In the baseline carried forward analysis, average weight loss in the control group 
is 2.6 pounds (1.29%) in the first quarter, 1.9 pounds (0.98%) in the second quarter, 1.7 
pounds (0.82%) in the third quarter, and 1.7 pounds (0.87%) in the fourth quarter.  These 
can be interpreted as the unconditional average effect of the program elements other than 
financial rewards (e.g. emails, call center access, and weigh-ins), because in a previous 
randomized experiment, a control group that received no treatment of any kind 
experienced virtually no change in average weight after 6 or 12 months (Jeffery, Wing, et 
al., 1993).  This suggests that changes in weight observed in the control group measure 
the effect of all elements of Company X treatment except financial rewards.   
In the standard incentives group, average weight loss is 2.2 pounds (1.13%) in the 
first quarter, 2.1 pounds (1.04%) in the second quarter, 2.2 pounds (1.03%) in the third 
quarter, and 1.4 pounds (0.64%) in the fourth quarter.  We fail to reject the null 
hypothesis of no difference between the control and standard incentives group; in fact, 
average weight loss is consistently lower in the standard incentives group than in the 
control group.   
Despite the small average weight loss in the standard incentives group, there are 
some substantial success stories; the maximum weight lost since baseline is 58.8 lbs. in 
quarter 1, 89.4 lbs. in quarter 2, 109.2 lbs. in quarter 3, and 116.8 lbs. in quarter 4.  For   26
any given mean, success stories are balanced by failures; for example, the maximum 
weight gain is 12.6 lbs. in quarter 1, 19.8 lbs. in quarter 2, 25 lbs. in quarter 3, and 25.6 
lbs. in quarter 4. 
Weight loss in the modified incentives group averages 3.2 pounds (1.55%) in the 
first quarter, 3.3 pounds (1.58%) in the second quarter, 2.5 pounds (1.21%) in the third 
quarter, and 3.6 pounds (1.77%) in the fourth quarter.  In quarter four (but not earlier 
quarters) the difference between the modified incentives group and the control group in 
average weight loss is statistically significant. 
We also measure weight loss by success in reaching certain benchmarks.  Table 9 
lists the percent of participants losing 5% of baseline weight, by group and quarter, for 
completers, last observation carried forward, and baseline carried forward analyses.  In 
the baseline carried forward analysis, the percentage of the control group that lost 5% of 
their baseline weight, by quarter, was: 9.3%, 7.8%, 13.2%, and 10.1%.   
Relative to the control group, it is generally the case that smaller percentages of 
the standard incentives group achieved 5% weight loss in each quarter (8.3%, 8.2%, 
7.9%, and 5.4%); the difference is statistically significant in quarters 3 and 4. 
Relative to the control group, higher percentages of the modified incentives group 
achieved 5% weight loss in each quarter (12.6%, 16.5%, 14.0%, 19.5%); the differences 
are statistically significant in quarters 2 and 4. 
We also examine the probabilities of losing 10% of baseline weight, the outcome 
that the NIH (1990) recommends for evaluating weight loss programs.  Table 10 lists the 
unconditional probabilities of losing 10% of baseline weight by group and quarter, for 
completers, last observation carried forward, and baseline carried forward analyses.    27
Assuming that dropouts returned to their baseline weight, the percentage of the control 
group that lost 10% of baseline weight, by quarter, was 0.0%, 2.3%, 2.3%, and 3.1%.  
These are comparable to the corresponding percentages for the standard incentives group 
(1.2%, 2.0%, 2.9%, and 2.4%); the differences are not statistically significant.  Relative 
to the control group, higher percentages of the modified incentives group achieved 10% 
weight loss in each quarter (2.1%, 4.3%, 3.8%, and 6.5%) but the differences are not 
statistically significant. 
We hypothesized that: In quarter 4 weight loss will be greater in the modified 
incentives group than in the standard incentives group.  This is true for the 
unconditional means in Table 8.  Assuming dropouts return to their baseline weight 
(baseline carried forward), average year-end weight loss is 3.6 pounds (1.77%) in the 
modified incentives group compared to 1.4 pounds (0.64%) in the standard incentives 
group, a difference significant at the 1% level.  Table 9 indicates that at the end of quarter 
4, 19.5% of the modified incentives group had lost 5% or more of their baseline weight, 
compared to only 5.4% of the standard incentives group, a difference significant at the 
1% level.  Table 10 shows that the percent losing 10% or more of baseline weight was 
6.5% in the modified incentives group and only 2.4% in the standard incentives group, a 
difference significant at the 1% level.   
In quarters 1 through 3, weight loss will be greater in the standard incentives 
group than in the modified incentives group. 
Contrary to our prediction, weight loss is greater in the modified incentives group 
than in the standard incentives group in quarters one through three.  Table 8 shows that 
those in the modified incentives group lost an average of 3.2, 3.3, and 2.5 pounds in the   28
first three quarters, compared to the standard incentives group average losses of 2.2, 2.1, 
and 2.2 pounds.  This difference is statistically significant at the 1% level in quarters one 
and two.  Table 9 shows that in each case a higher proportion of the modified incentives 
group than the standard incentives group achieved 5% weight loss: 12.6% versus 8.3% in 
quarter one, 16.5% versus 8.2% in quarter two, and 14.0% versus 7.9% in quarter three; 
in each case these differences are statistically significant at the 1% level.  Table 10 shows 
that the probability of losing 10% or more of baseline weight is consistently higher in the 
modified incentives group than the standard incentives group, and the difference is 
statistically significant in quarter 2.   
These results suggest that the effect of greater financial incentives for the standard 
incentives group is swamped by some combination of more favorable selection into the 
modified incentives group, loss aversion, and the necessity of starting early to achieve 
5% or 10% weight loss by the end of quarter four. 
 
Discussion: 
A 2007 Institute of Medicine report on preventing obesity set the immediate next 
step – which it described as an essential priority action for the near future – as “learning 
what works and what does not work and broadly sharing that information.” (IOM 2007, 
p. 410).  It also notes that “All types of evaluation can make an important contribution to 
the evidence base upon which to design policies, programs, and interventions.” (Ibid, p. 
4).  This paper makes a contribution to that effort by documenting attrition and weight 
loss in a large program that offers financial incentives for weight loss.   29
The program studied is of particular interest because it is a real-world 
intervention, not a pilot program designed and monitored by researchers.  As a result, the 
data are informative about how such interventions work in the real-world.  However, 
because it is a real-world intervention, it suffers the limitations of selection by employers 
of incentive schedule, and a relatively small control group (129 out of a total sample of 
2,407). 
We study the two outcomes recommended by the NIH for evaluating weight loss 
interventions: attrition and weight loss.  We find higher attrition (up to 76.4% after one 
year) than virtually all previous studies (see Appendix Table 1 and Paul-Ebhohimhen and 
Avenell, 2007).  Another recent study of real-world wagers on own weight loss also 
found 80% failure (Burger and Lynham, 2008).   
We find that the financial rewards in this program are associated with modest 
changes in weight.  After one year, those in the modified incentives group lose 1.9 
pounds more than those in the control group, while the weight loss of those in the 
standard incentives group is not statistically distinguishable from that of the control 
group.  The NIH considers a loss of 10% of baseline weight in 6 months to one year to be 
good progress for an obese individual (NHLBI 2000).  By this standard, very few 
participants in this program achieve good progress toward weight loss: just 2.4% of the 
standard incentives group and 6.5% of the modified incentives group lost 10% of their 
starting weight in 12 months.  By most measures, participants in the modified incentives 
group had 12-month weight loss that was greater than those in the standard incentives 
group, but it is not clear how much of this is due to selection and how much is due to 
bonds, controlling for selection.     30
The weight loss associated with the program we examine is generally smaller than 
that documented in the previous literature.  For example, Volpp et al. (2008) estimate 
mean 16-week weight loss to be 13.1 lbs. when rewards take the form of a lottery with a 
daily expected value of $3, and 14.0 lbs. when the rewards take the form of deposit 
contracts or bonds, whose amount is chosen by the enrollee but can vary between $0 and 
$3 per day and is matched 1:1 if the weight loss goal is achieved.   
Our findings are closer to those of Finkelstein et al. (2007), who find modest 
weight loss (between 2.0 and 4.7 lbs.) at three months, but no significant weight loss at 
six months, associated with financial rewards that varied between $7 and $14 per 
percentage point of weight lost after six months.  Likewise, Butsch et al. (2007) find no 
significant difference in 12-week weight loss between a treatment group offered a $150 
refund of their enrollment fee if they lost 6% of their initial weight, and a control group 
which was not eligible for such a refund. 
Overall, our findings regarding attrition and weight loss suggest that the 
experience of pilot programs (such as those described in Appendix Table 1) may be 
overoptimistic about what can be achieved on a larger scale. 
To put our findings in a the broader context of what works to promote weight 
loss, a literature review (Douketis et al. 2005) found that dietary and lifestyle therapy 
tends to result in less than 5 kg weight loss after 2-4 years, pharmacologic therapy results 
in 5-10 kg weight loss after 1-2 years, and surgical therapy results in 25-75 kg weight 
loss after 2-4 years.  At this point, financial rewards remain a promising method for 
weight loss but it remains to be seen whether they can be as effective as traditional 
medical approaches.     31
This paper presents the basic patterns in the data.  Our follow-up work will 
estimate hazard models of attrition and estimate regression models of weight loss to 
measure the change in weight associated with the incentive schedules, controlling for the 
observable characteristics of participants.  Future research in this area should also focus 
on the optimal design of financial incentives for maximizing loss of excess weight, 
finding ways to decrease attrition, whether offering extrinsic rewards decreases intrinsic 
motivation, and whether weight loss is maintained after financial incentives for weight 
loss are removed. 
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Figure 2-1: Distribution of Percent Weight Loss under Standard incentives 














































‐10 ‐5051 0 1 5 2 0 m o r e  
than 25
Baseline Carry‐Forward  39
















































‐10 ‐5051 0 1 5 2 0 m o r e  
than 25
Baseline Carry‐Forward  40
















































‐10 ‐5051 0 1 5 2 0 m o r e  
than 25
Baseline Carry‐Forward  41





































































































‐10 ‐5051 0 1 5 2 0 m o r e  
than 25
Baseline Carry‐Forward  43
















































‐10 ‐5051 0 1 5 2 0 m o r e  
than 25
Baseline Carry‐Forward  44

















































‐10 ‐5051 0 1 5 2 0 m o r e  
than 25
Baseline Carry‐Forward  45

















































‐10 ‐5 0 5 1 01 52 0 m o r e  
than 25
Baseline Carry‐Forward  46
























































































































































‐10 ‐5051 0 1 5 2 0 m o r e  
than 25
Baseline Carry‐Forward  49























































Table 1: Financial Rewards Based on Weight Loss 
“Standard incentives” 
 
Weight Loss  
(as % of Baseline Weight) 













Notes: Only participants with BMI over 25 (that is, those who are overweight or obese) 
are eligible to receive incentives.  Moreover, people can only get incentives for weight 
loss down to a BMI of 25 – there is no financial incentive for anyone in the healthy 
weight (18.5 to 25) or underweight (<18.5) BMI categories to lose weight. 
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Table 2: Financial Rewards Based on Weight Loss 
“Modified incentives” 
 
Weight Loss  
(as % of Baseline Weight) 
Reward 
(Some Quarterly, Some Annual) 
Greater than zero  Entered into quarterly drawing for gift 
certificates: ten $50 gift cards each 
quarter and ten $50 salon vouchers each 
quarter. 
5  Complete reimbursement of monthly 
fees (11 * $9.95 = $109.45), paid at end 
of year 
10  Complete reimbursement of monthly 
fees (11 * $9.95 = $109.45) plus $100 
bonus, paid at end of year 
“Biggest loser” (as % of baseline) 
at worksite 
$250 gift certificate, awarded at end of 
year, plus the appropriate award listed 




Notes: Only participants with BMI over 25 (that is, those who are overweight or obese) 
are eligible to receive incentives.  Moreover, people can only get incentives for weight 
loss down to a BMI of 25 – there is no financial incentive for anyone in the healthy 
weight (18.5 to 25) or underweight (<18.5) BMI categories to lose weight. 
    52
 
Table 3:  Description of Employers 
 
Employer Description  Incentive  Schedule 
1  HMO clinic - nurses  Standard 
2 Banking  office  Standard 
3 HMO  office  Standard 
4 Banking  office  Standard 
5 Insurance  office  Standard 
6 Insurance  company  Modified 
7  Grocery administrative office  Control  
 
  
Table 4: Summary Statistics by Group 
 
  Standard Incentives  Modified Incentives  Control Group 
Variable  Obs  Mean  Std. Dev  Obs  Mean  Std. Dev  Obs  Mean  Std. Dev 
Initial BMI  1513  32.8  6.24  765  32.8  6.00  129  31.3  5.72 
Male 1513  0.157  0.364  765  0.212  0.409  129  0.357  0.481 
Age 1513  46.2  10.4  765  43.0  8.8  129  44.4  10.6 
Height 1513  65.5  3.41  765  66.1  3.42  129  66.7  4.25 
Overweight (30>BMI>=25)  1513  0.412  0.492  765  0.382  0.486  129  0.519  0.502 
Obese (40>BMI>=30)  1513  0.301  0.459  765  0.314  0.464  129  0.256  0.438 
Morbidly Obese (BMI>=40)  1513  0.287  0.452  765  0.305  0.461  129  0.225  0.419 
Foundation exercise regimen  1513  0.601  0.490  765  0.550  0.498  129  0.488  0.502 
Intermediate exercise regimen  1513  0.337  0.473  765  0.374  0.484  129  0.426  0.496 
Advanced exercise regimen  1513  0.062  0.241  765  0.076  0.265  129  0.085  0.280 
Email open rate  740  45.7  36.41  765  51.0  35.09  129  28.7  32.47 
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Table 5: Enrollment Rates  
  Control   Standard Incentive  Modified Incentive     
  Group Group  Group  p-value   p-value   p-value  
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (1) equals (2)  (1) equals (3)  (2) equals (3) 
Mean  0.203  0.248  0.186  0.613 0.839 0.477 
(Std.  Dev.)  (0.100)  (0.115)  (0.024)     
 
Note: Enrollment rates are calculated by the fraction of those who enroll in the program by the total population of the work place. 
Individuals with BMI<25 may enroll in the program, but receive no payouts.   55
 
 









t  24.8% 25.6% 
2  62.1%*
t 33.5%  39.5% 
3  72.0%*
t 39.3%  45.0% 
4  76.4%*
t 57.4%*  48.1% 
* represents significant difference with the control group at the 5% level 
trepresents significant difference between standard and modified incentive groups at the 5% level  56
Table 7: Weight Loss by Future Attrition Status 
 
Full Sample      
Quarter  Persist in next quarter  Dropout next quarter  ttest p-value 
1 4.67  3.49 0.004 
 (2.3%)  (1.8%)   
2 5.73  3.33 0.000 
 (2.8%)  (1.7%)   
3 6.38  4.23 0.008 
 (3.1%)  (2.0%)   
      
Standard Incentive Group    
Quarter  Persist in next quarter  Dropout next quarter  ttest p-value 
1 4.90  4.07 0.122 
 (2.5%)  (2.1%)   
2 6.67  3.99 0.003 
 (3.2%)  (2.0%)   
3 6.93  8.96 0.128 
 (3.2%)  (4.3%)   
      
Modified Incentive Group    
Quarter  Persist in next quarter  Dropout next quarter  ttest p-value 
1 4.66  1.03 0.000 
 (2.3%)  (0.6%)   
2 5.36  0.76 0.001 
 (2.6%)  (0.3%)   
3 6.77  -1.91  0.000 
 (3.4%)  (-1.0%)   
      
Control Group      
Quarter  Persist in next quarter  Dropout next quarter  ttest p-value 
1 3.42  3.54 0.929 
 (1.8%)  (1.5%)   
2 3.46  1.36 0.325 
 (1.9%)  (0.6%)   
3 1.82  7.99 0.041 
   (0.9%)  (4.0%)    
   Weight loss in pounds (Percent weight loss in parenthesis)  57
Table 8: Weight Loss in Pounds and Percent of Baseline Weight, by Group and Quarter 
      Standard     Modified  Control 




























1 4.6  2.2
t 2.2
t  4.2  3.2 3.2 3.4  2.6  2.6 
(2.31%) (1.13%)  (1.13)  (2.06%)  (1.55%) (1.55%) (1.73%)  (1.29%)  (1.29%) 
Min = -12.6        Min = -11.6       Min = -6.0     
Max = 58.8        Max = 34.6       Max = 19.6     
                    
2  5.5*
t  2.7  2.1
t  4.9  3.3 3.3 3.1  2.4  1.9 
(2.73%) (1.34%)  (1.04%) (2.38%)  (1.64%) (1.58%) (1.62%)  (1.21%)  (0.98%) 
Min = -19.8        Min = -18.4       Min = -8.8     
Max = 89.4        Max = 52.8       Max = 30.2     
3  7.77*
t  3.2  2.2 4.1  2.6 2.5 3.0  2.2  1.7 
(3.68%) (1.54%)  (1.03%) (2.00%)  (1.27%) (1.21%) (1.49%)  (1.06%)  (0.82%) 
Min = -25        Min = -29.8       Min = -22.2     
Max = 109.2        Max = 53.6       Max = 32     
4  6.1
t  3.2  1.4
t  8.4*  3.3 3.6* 3.2  2.9  1.7 
(2.75%) (1.52%)  (0.64%) (4.15%)  (1.61%) (1.77%) (1.68%)  (1.47%)  (0.87%) 
Min = -25.6        Min = -30.6       Min = -13.8     
Max = 116.8        Max = 61.2       Max = 30.8     
Note: A positive number indicates weight lost.  A negative number (e.g. for the minimum weight loss) indicates weight gain.  
* represents significant difference with the control group at the 5% level 
trepresents significant difference between standard and modified incentive groups at the 5% level   58
Table 9: Percent of Respondents Losing 5% of Baseline Weight, by Group and Quarter 
 
                       
   Standard  Modified  Control 




























1  17.1%  8.3%
t 8.3%
t  16.7% 12.6%  12.6%  12.5% 9.3%  9.3% 
2  21.6% 10.8%
t 8.2%
t 24.8%*  16.9% 16.5%*  12.8%  10.1%  7.8% 
3  28.1% 13.0% 7.9%*




t 45.7%*  20.9% 19.5%* 19.4%  17.8%  10.1% 
* represents significant difference with the control group at the 5% level 
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Table 10: Percent of Respondents Losing 10% of Baseline Weight, by Group and Quarter 
 
                      
   Standard  Modified  Control 




























1  2.4% 1.2%  1.2% 2.8% 2.1%  2.1% 0.0% 0.0%  0.0% 
2  5.2% 2.2%
t 2.0%
t  6.5% 4.3%  4.3% 3.8% 2.3%  2.3% 
3  10.4%




t  15.3%*  6.8%  6.5% 6.0% 4.7%  3.1% 
* represents significant difference with the control group at the 5% level 
trepresents significant difference between standard and modified incentive groups at the 5% level   60
Appendix Table 1: 
Previous Literature on Financial Incentives for Weight Loss 
 
Study  Study Design  Intervention and Incentives  Sample Size and 
Population 
Duration Weight  Loss Attrition 




3 groups:  
 
Deposits contract of $0-$3 / day 
matched 1:1. 
 
Lottery for daily prize with E[V]=$3. 
 
Self-reported daily weight. 
 
$20 for monthly weigh- in, 
unconditionally 





Affairs Medical Center 
with BMI 30-40 
16 weeks  Mean weight loss:  
Lottery: 13.1 lbs 
 
Deposit contracts: 14.0 
 








from William Hill 
betting agency for 
1993-2006 
Maximum bet of $65.  William Hill 
offered odds ranging from 5:1 to 50:1; 
potential payoff averaged $1,926. 
 
Average duration of bet is 8 months, 
weight to be lost ranges from 28-168 
lbs. 
 
Each bettor weighed at start and end of 
bet by physician. 
 




of British population. 
Average of 8 
months 
Approximately 80% of 
people betting on their 
weight loss lose the 
bet 
Approximate




loss lose the 
bet 
Finkelstein 
et al. (2007) 
Randomized trial, 
no control group 
Three groups:  
Back loaded: $0 at 3 months, $14 per 
% point lost at 6 months 
 
Front loaded: $14 per % point lost at 3 
months, $0 at 6 months 
 
Steady payment: $7 per % point lost at 
N=207 (72 in Back 
Loaded, 64 in Front 
Loaded, 71 in Steady 
Payment) 
 
Overweight and obese 
employees at one 
university and 3 
6 months  Mean weight loss 3 
months: 
2 lbs for Back Loaded, 
4.7 lbs for Front 
Loaded, 3 lbs for 
Steady Payment 
 
Mean weight loss at 6 





Payment   61
both 3 months and 6 months 
 
Weigh-ins at 3 months and 6 months. 
 
Incentives only up to 10% weight loss 
($140) 












Treatment group eligible for 50% 
reimbursement of enrollment fee ($150 
of $300) if lose 6% of initial weight 
and attend 10 of 12 group sessions 
 
Control group was not eligible for 
reimbursement 
N=401 (241 
intervention of which 
59 enrolled, 160 
control of which 40 
enrolled) 
 





BMI 30 and over. 
12 weeks  Mean weight loss: 
2.25%  in control 








matching of 4 
controls to each 
member of 
intervention group 
Treatment group eligible for 50% of 
cost of program fees ($150 of $300) if 
lose 6% of initial weight and attend 10 
of 12 group sessions. 
 
Control group was not eligible for 
reimbursement 
N=125:  
25 in intervention 
group, 100 in control 
group 
 
Participants in Univ. 
Alabama at 
Birmingham EatRight 




BMI 30 and over. 
12 weeks  Mean weight loss: 7.3 
kg (6.1%) in 
intervention group, 4.0 














Worksites divided evenly between 
treatment and control groups. 
 
Treatment (Healthy Worker Project) 
consisted of health education classes 
and payroll deductions that served as 
32 worksites in 
Minneapolis / St. Paul 
metropolitan area.   
 
Of 10,000 employees 
in treatment worksites, 
2 years  No treatment effect 
was found for weight. 
 
In cohort survey, 
average change in 
BMI was 0.08 units for 
No attrition 
of worksites.    62
bonds – refunded if achieve weight loss 
goals or donated to charity otherwise. 
 
Goals chosen by employee and ranged 
from minimum of 0 lb and maximum 
of 1% body weight loss each week.   
 
Participants chose amount of payroll 
deduction (minimum of $5 biweekly). 
 
200 employees surveyed at baseline 
and again after 2 years (cohort). 
Another 200 employees surveyed after 
2 years (cross-section).  
 
Weight self-reported but corrected for 
reporting error. 
2,041 employees 




control group, -0.02 
units for treatment 





change in BMI was -
0.05 in both the 
treatment and control 
groups. 
Jeffery, 





Five groups: 1) control; 2) standard 
behavioral therapy (SBT); 3) SBT plus 
food provision; 4) SBT plus incentives; 
5) SBT plus food provision plus 
incentives. 
 
Weekly incentives: $0 if gained weight, 
$2.50 if did not gain weight; $12.50 if 
weight loss was 50% of goal, $25 if 
weight loss reached goal. 
 
Weight-loss goals could be either 14, 
18, or 23 kg during course of program. 
 
Weight measured at baseline, 6, 12, 
and 18 months.  There were also 
optional weekly weigh-ins. 




of which 40 to 41 were 
in each of the 5 
groups. 
 
Had to be 14-32 kg 
overweight 
18 months  No effect of financial 
incentives or the 
interaction of financial 
incentives with food 
provision 
11% attrition 
at 6 months, 
13% at 12 
months, 15% 
at 18 months 




Two groups: 1) offered a weight 
control newsletter program for price of 
$5; 2) offered the same program for 
N=1,304 residents of 
Bloomington 
Minnesota: 
6 months  Weight loss averaged 
about 4 lbs for $5 
program and 8 lbs for 
3.8% did not 
return survey   63
free but requiring a $60 deposit that 
would be refunded based on 
(proportional to) success in weight loss. 
 
Individuals chose weight loss goals of 
not more than 4 lb a month. 
 
Weight self-reported (questionnaire, 
telephone survey).  For subset of 
respondents, validation of self-report 
through measurement of weight. 
1,190 in the $5 
newsletter program 










Three groups: 1) monthly financial 
contingencies for weight maintenance; 
2) monthly financial contingencies for 
participation in training sessions to 
solidify behavioral changes; 3) no 
treatment. 
 
$120 deposit.  For each of 12 sessions 
not attended, participant forfeited $10.  
Refund also withheld if weighed more 
than “baseline” (post-first-treatment) 
weight.  Withheld refunds (forfeited 
moneys) were distributed among those 
who were at or below “baseline” 
weight at final session. 
 
Weight measured at “baseline” and at 
one year. 
N=85 individuals who 
had already lost 10% 
or more of their body 
weight through a 15-
week weight-loss 
program. 
1 year  Incentives had no 
impact on weight 
maintenance / amount 
of weight regained.  
Average weight 
regain: 10.3 lbs in 
control group, 11.9 
lbs. in group with 
incentives. 
6 of 28 


















Three groups: 1) regular contract, 2) 
difficulty-grade contract; 3) no contract 
(control) 
 
All deposited $150. 
Immediately refunded to control group. 
Regular contract group received $30 
for each 5-lb. increment of weight loss 
N=113 
 
Roughly half recruited 
from population 
sample and the other 
half from newspaper 
advertisements 
15 weeks  Average weight loss: 
26.2 lbs (12.8%) in 
difficulty-grade 
contract 
21.7 lbs (10.8%) in 
regular contract 









weight, and 5   64
Difficult-grade contract group received 
$5 for first 5 lbs lost, $10 for second, 













Six treatment groups: 3 levels of 
deposit ($30, $150, $300) times two 
types of payoff criteria: individual 
weight loss or mean group weight loss. 
 
All received 15-week behaviorally 
oriented program.  Goal was 30 pounds 
lost. 
 
Cash refunds per week at rate of $1, $5, 
or $10 per pound up to 2 pounds per 
week. 
 
Monies not refunded for weight loss by 
end of program were distributed 
equally among those who achieved the 
30-pound weight loss goal. 
 
Participants were weighed weekly. 
N=89 
 
Men in the 
Minneapolis area with 
self-reported weight at 
least 30 pounds above 
the ideal. 
15 weeks  Individuals rewarded 
for group performance 
lost on average 5 lbs. 
more weight.  This 
difference was 
maintained over 1 year 
follow-up. 
 
No significant effects 









Four treatment groups: 2 incentivized 
behaviors (weight loss or decrease in 
calorie consumption) by 2 frequencies 
of therapeutic contact (5 times or 1 
time per week) 
 
Deposits were equal to 15 weeks’ 
allowance or 50% of earnings from 
part-time work; amounts varied from 
$15-$240 (mean=$67.75).  Source of 
payment: parents (51.5%), subjects 




Adolescents at least 
10% above average 
weight-for-height. 
15 weeks  The treatment group 
receiving rewards for 
weight loss and 
coming to the clinic 5 
times per week was 





maintained over a 6-
month follow-up 
period. 
None   65
Weight loss goal was 1 lb. per week, or 
caloric reduction necessary to lose 1 lb. 
per week.  Monetary reward was 
delivered either once per week or once 
per week at treatment center. 
 
Weighed at each clinic visit. 









difference based on 
whether parents or 
subject paid the 
deposit 





Three treatment groups: deposits were 
returned contingent on either 
attendance, calorie restriction, or 
weight loss.  Also a control group. 
 
Each of the three treatment groups 
deposited $200.  One group paid $20 
for losing 2 lbs. per week.  Another 
paid $20 for calorie restrictions 
calculated to cause loss of 2 lbs. per 







people who need to 
lose 50 lbs. or more. 
10 weeks  Groups rewarded for 
weight loss or calorie 
reductions lost an 
average of 20 lbs, 
significantly more 
weight loss than either 
the group rewarded for 
attendance (8.6 lbs) or 
the control group (12.4 
lbs). 







Subjects deposited a large number of 
valuables (e.g. money, jewelry, medals) 
with the researcher and signed a 
Contingency Contract allowing the 
researcher to switch them from 
treatment to control conditions, with 
the treatment being valuables being 
either returned or forfeited based on 
weight loss. 
 
One valuable was returned for each 2 






advertisement.  All 
agreed to lose 25 










weight loss of 1.6 to 
1.7 pounds during 
treatment, regain of 
1.4 pounds per week 
when incentives 
removed. 
None   66
Subjects weighed every Monday, 
Wednesday, and Friday. 
 
 